Geography did not merely help the Marathas — it chose their strategy for them. The Sahyadri hills made forts and guerrilla warfare the cheapest way to fight; the Konkan coastline made a navy necessary; and the open Deccan plateau beyond made fast cavalry the way to project power across India.
1. Mountains made guerrilla warfare cheap and siege warfare expensive. The chapter says Shivaji ‘had recourse to the tactic of guerrilla warfare, which uses small groups of people in a focused way, with speed, surprise, and knowledge of the terrain’. That definition only works in broken country. In the Sahyadri, an army must move along narrow passes; a small local force can strike the head or the tail of the column and vanish uphill. Afzal Khan’s army was routed by Marathas ‘hidden in the mountains’ at the foot of Pratapgad, in thick forest.
2. Mountains made forts the natural form of the state. A hilltop with one steep approach can be held by a few hundred men against thousands. So Shivaji began, at sixteen, by ‘capturing neglected and unoccupied forts and strengthening their defences’, and forts became ‘the mainstay of Maratha power’. Ramachandrapant Amatya could therefore write that the kingdom ‘was created … from forts alone’.
3. The coastline forced a navy into existence. When the kingdom reached India’s west coast, Shivaji needed access to coastal resources — and a coast that cannot be defended is a coast the enemy can land on. So the Maratha navy was founded in 1657, with naval fortifications such as Sindhudurg (Fig. 3.6). This was unusual: Bijapur had merchant ships but no full-time naval force, and even Mughal use of a navy was very limited.
4. The coastline also decided who the enemy would be. Because the Marathas held ports — the map shows Dabhol, Rajapur, Malwan and Vengurla, with routes out to Muscat, Mocha and Malacca — they collided directly with European sea power, which rested on the cartaz pass system. Kanhoji Angre won ‘thanks to a clever use of geography and battle tactics’ even though Maratha ships were technologically behind European ones. Geography compensated for technology.
5. The plateau shaped expansion. Beyond the Ghats the land opens out. Open country favours mounted troops who move fast and live off the march — which is exactly how chauth and sardeshmukhi could be collected from provinces the Marathas did not garrison. The same mobility carried them to Delhi, Lahore, Attock and Peshawar in the 18th century.
6. Distance itself became a weapon. The dakṣhiṇa-digvijaya of 1677 added present-day northern Tamil Nadu and parts of Karnataka, which the chapter says ‘later gave the Marathas great strategic depth against the Mughal invasion’. When Aurangzeb took Raigad, Rajaram simply continued the war from Gingee, far to the south. A state with depth cannot be finished by capturing its capital.